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Creating Creativity: Reflections from Fieldwork  
 
Vlad Petre Glăveanu 
London School of Economics 
 
The present article addresses the question of ‘When can we say something is creative?’ 
and, in answering it, takes a critical stand towards past and present scientific definitions of 
creativity. It challenges an implicit assumption in much psychological theory and research 
that creativity exists as an ‘objective’ feature of persons or products, universally recognised 
and independent of social agreement and cultural systems of norms and beliefs. Focusing 
on everyday life creative outcomes, the article includes both theoretical accounts and 
empirical examples from a research exploring creativity evaluations in the context of folk 
art. In the end, a multi-layered perspective of creativity assessment emerges, integrating 
dimensions such as newness and originality, value and usefulness, subjective reception and 
cultural reception of creative products. Implications for how we understand and study 
creativity are discussed.  
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Despite what the title might suggest at first sight, this article is dedicated to the 
‘reception’ (by means of identification and assessment) and not the ‘production’ of 
creativity. Its starting point is the fundamental question ‘When can we say something is 
creative?’ and its main domain of focus is the creativity of everyday life. This has been 
chosen considering the fact that ‘ordinary creativity’ is both pervasive and oftentimes 
unremarked (Bateson, 1999, p. 154). Acts of ‘historical creativity’, like celebrated 
artworks or influential theories, tend to stand out as mountain peaks and their creativity 
is often taken-for-granted, but creative expression exists also well beyond the world of 
research labs and art studios (Fischer et al., 2005, p. 484). In fact, as Ellis Paul Torrance 
(1988, p. 43), an illustrious figure in the psychology of creativity, stated, “Creativity is 
almost infinite. It involves every sense – sight, smell, hearing, feeling, taste, and even 
perhaps the extrasensory”. For him, creativity is required whenever the person has no 
learned solution for an existing problem, and there are countless situations in our daily 
lives when this is the case. One should not disregard of course the power of ‘routines’ in 
leading human behaviour, and yet, even when faced with habituated ways of doing 
things, novelty can characterise the details of our actions. Creativity and routine, the 
guiding principles of human behaviour, illustrate a ‘reversible figures’ situation where, 
depending on how we decide to look at things, one will stand as the main figure, and 
the other as the perceptual background. In effect, whenever a creative solution is 
successful and moves beyond routines (Borofsky, 2001, p. 66), it will certainly become 
part of future routines, thus contributing to the never-ending cycle of our daily actions 
and inter-actions. 
 
This state of affairs makes recognising creativity difficult. If departing from what already 
exists is the defining feature of creativity, how can we say when something is 
‘sufficiently’ different to be called creative? Plus, contemporary creativity theory, as we 
shall see next, emphasises the fact that creative outcomes should also be of social or 
practical value. This twofold condition is typically hard to appreciate or to satisfy. For 
example is children’s play creative? An overwhelming number of teachers and parents 
would be ready to testify that it is. And yet, rigorously following scientific definitions 
children are unlikely to produce in their play anything of true value and their ‘right’ to 
creativity can be contested on this basis (Cohen and Ambrose, 1999, p. 11). What 
about a musician playing in an orchestra? Again, who would deny creativity to an 
artist? However, strictly speaking, we could be the victims of an attributional bias in 
considering musicians, dancers, comedians and other ‘performers’ creative instead of 
the actual ‘authors’, the composers, choreographs and writers (Kasof, 1995, p. 330). Of 
course this argument can be challenged by pointing to the fact that every re-edition is 
never simply a ‘duplication’ but a new performance in itself (see Eco’s, 1989, notion of 
‘open work’). But then what about copying and imitation? They must surely be 
uncreative types of activity. Well, pushing the previous argument forward, one could 
come to see the important role of improvisation in aligning the observation of the 
model with acting in the world to produce the ‘copy’ (Ingold and Hallam, 2007, p. 5). 
Following from this last example we can start wondering if, in fact, everything is 
creative. Let’s consider language, as possibly the “best example of everyday 
creativity” (Runco, 2007, p. x). We always ‘create’ sentences we never heard before 
and they all have an indisputable value (for communication, self-regulation, etc.).   
 
This is probably a good time to think about the implications of considering that 
everything is (potentially) creative: it would simply do away with the notion of creativity. 
We must resist the temptation of collapsing creativity into everyday life, and making 
these two utterly indistinguishable (Negus and Pickering, 2004, p. 45; also Hausman, 
1979). This is actually the stance of science which, faced with the ubiquity of creative 
expression, searches for the limits of creativity (Rouquette, 1973). A bounderless 
phenomenon is also meaningless and so is one whose specific qualities are not clearly 
distinguishable. In the case of creativity this last remark raises the question of how we 
could separate the ‘creative’ from the beautiful, the adaptive, the technically suitable 
or the merely bizarre. Oftentimes, judging a creative outcome is intrinsically linked to 
considering its technical aspects or its importance for responding to society’s needs 
(Lubart, 2003). Furthermore, we are also confronted with the aspect of intentionality. Do 
‘creators’, when they ‘create’, actually want to be creative? Or are they simply trying 
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to make something beautiful, something interesting, something useful for their life or the 
lives of others?  
 
And yet, despite all difficulties, science perseverates in studying creativity. And the first 
step taken to differentiate the creative from the non-creative is to locate and ‘isolate’ 
creativity. Traditionally, creativity has been associated in psychology with either the 
creative person or the creative product (see Glăveanu, 2010a). From these two the 
creative product approach seems to be the most commonly used and the most fertile 
for scientific investigations (Amabile, 1996; Bailin, 1988; Hausman, 1979). Products have 
the obvious advantage of being available for measurement and evaluation. They also 
help us make inferences about the ‘who’ and ‘how’ of creativity (person and process). 
Although this focus in the psychology of creativity has been questioned (see Runco’s, 
2007, p. 384, notion of ‘product bias’), it is probably one of the best starting points in our 
quest to answer the question ‘When can we say something is creative?’ There is great 
consensus in the literature that something is creative when it is both: a) novel or original 
and b) useful or valuable (Stein, 1962; Martindale, 1994; Gruber and Wallace, 1999; 
Mayer, 1999; Manson, 2003; Mumford, 2003). These two criteria circumscribe the 
scientific vision of creativity or, to be more precise, the Western scientific vision of 
creativity (Montuori and Purser, 1995; Westwood and Low, 2003). Is this also the basis for 
creativity judgements made by non-scientists; is this what people take to be creative 
when they talk about creativity and ‘recognise’ it? What does common sense say?  
 
This kind of questions have seldom been raised in the study of creativity, and when they 
have, it was mostly in the spirit of taking scientific definitions as the ultimate markers of 
what ‘true’ creativity is. Indeed, science strives for objectivity, and creativity science 
uses its established definition to capture ‘creativity in itself’. There is a clear underlying 
assumption that creativity exists as such, independent of social agreement, cultural 
conventions, above and beyond commonsensical ideas. However, even the actual 
definition of creativity in terms of novelty and usefulness exposes its cultural relativity. In 
the words of Flaherty (2005, p. 147), “using a lever to move a rock might be judged 
novel in a Cro-Magnon civilization, but not in a modern one”. Usefulness also implies a 
relational standard of appreciation (useful to whom and for what?). Trying to achieve a 
‘pure gaze’ on creativity, researchers are often more preoccupied with great creations 
and great creators and forget the everyday life dynamics of the phenomenon. In the 
very end, any clear-cut distinctions between great creators and ordinary creators, 
great creations and ordinary creations, do not hold. All creativity takes place in social 
and cultural contexts (Glăveanu, 2010a, 2010b) and the study of how it is received and 
recognised in these contexts is of utmost importance. Scientific views are not to be 
disregarded, nor are they to be transformed into ‘ultimate answers’. Science and 
common sense should not be each other’s enemy, especially if we consider the 
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multitude of ways in which they come to inform one another. The real question is: what 
does each do with the ‘inputs’ received from the other? 
 
The present article will therefore make an attempt to integrate scientific and 
‘commonsensical’ notions of creativity. In doing so, it will be structured around the 
scientific criteria for creativity (newness, originality, usefulness, expert judgements, etc.) 
while at the same time shed light on how these criteria are expressed in everyday 
settings. This will be facilitated by making reference to examples from an area often 
associated with ‘ordinary creativity’, that of folk art. In the end, based on both 
theoretical considerations and empirical illustration, the importance of ‘cultural frames’ 
for the reception of creativity will become obvious. Conclusions will be drawn 
regarding a multi-layered approach to creativity assessment, one meant to reunite the 
‘objective’ aspects of creativity with its critical subjective and social dimensions.           
 
The fieldwork  
 
Empirical examples in this article come from a research project that explores creativity 
in Easter egg decoration in a Romanian context (also in Glăveanu, forthcoming). 
Informed by a cultural psychology approach (see Cole, 1996), the project uses primarily 
naturalistic observation and semi-structured interviews to investigate the 
interdependence between creative expression and reception among adults and 
children from both urban and rural settings. The craft of egg decoration has been 
chosen for its richness of practices, connecting the realms of folklore, art and religion as 
well as, more recently, the requirements of a growing market for the distribution of 
Easter eggs. The egg itself is an object of tremendous symbolic value in cultures around 
the world (see Newell, 1984) and in Romania egg decoration is a custom with very 
ancient, probably pre-Christian roots (Gorovei, 2001, p. 62), one of the oldest and most 
wide-spread folk arts in the country (Zahacincshi and Zahacinschi, 1992, p. 22). Egg 
decoration before Easter is ubiquitous in cities and villages in Romania and highly 
expressive of national and religious identities. 
 
If in urban settings the decoration techniques are based mainly, but not exclusively, on 
dying eggs, principally in red (symbolic of the blood of Christ), it is in the rural areas that 
‘traditional’ forms of wax decoration are practiced. Women are the main ‘artists’ of the 
craft, often joined by children and sometimes by men, and can produce, especially in 
villages in Northern Romania, great numbers of decorated eggs working throughout 
the year (Hutt, 2005). Traditional decoration generates both monochrome and 
polychrome eggs (hen and duck most often, occasionally goose, ostrich, etc.) and it is 
based on applying wax at different stages to draw the motifs on the emptied egg shell 
while successively immersing the egg in colour (usually yellow, followed by red and 
finally black). There is an impressive number of motifs displayed on Easter eggs, 
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representing geometric shapes, plants, animals, people and familiar objects (typically 
in the form of schematised parts; Gorovei, 2001). Decoration work involves combining 
these shapes and colours and oftentimes generating new ones, and this also explains 
how the craft has changed over the last decades, “getting further and further from the 
initial magical symbol, (…) [and closer to being an] artistic jewellery that gives priority to 
beauty in itself” (Zahacincshi and Zahacinschi, 1992, p. 50). Besides dying and 
decorating them with wax, there are many other ways of adorning eggs, from the use 
of leaves applied on the shell before colouring to the application of stickers, a clear 
sign of modernity spreading rapidly from city to village.   
 
In this context, the fieldwork for this research was very diverse, including settings such as 
private homes, schools, museums, fairs, community celebrations, etc. For the purpose 
of the present article though reference will be made exclusively to data obtained 
through interviewing ethnographers (7), priests (6), art teachers (6), and folk artists (8) 
about the craft, about creativity and, of course, about the creativity of Easter eggs.    
 
New and Original  
 
Novelty and originality can be said to represent the ‘essence’ of creativity, and this is 
probably so for both scientific and lay understandings of the phenomenon. Creativity 
means, in the end, to bring something new into being, something different compared 
to the past (Hausman, 1979, p. 239). This feature is included virtually in all definitions of 
creativity, explicitly or implicitly (Torrance, 1988, p. 43; see also Barron, 1995; Liep, 2001). 
‘New’ is the necessary precondition but not the sufficient one. The creative product 
also needs to be original, meaning to differ substantially from what already exists. Here 
things become more complicated since something can be original for the person, but 
not for the entire society. This led to established distinctions in the creativity literature 
between P-creative (new for the individual) and H-creative (new for society) (Boden, 
1994), or, more generally, between ‘mundane creativity’ and ‘mature creativity’ 
(Cohen and Ambrose, 1999, p. 9). Reinforcing this division, modern Western societies at 
least are often characterised by their ‘obsession’ with ‘high creativity’ and originality at 
all costs (one needs only to think about contemporary art). And yet, if we take into 
account the fact that all creativity is founded on the combination of old ideas (Liep, 
2001), the mere notion of ‘complete originality’ becomes a logical impossibility.  
 
The idea that one can be creative by following traditions and conventions, moreover, 
that it can only be creative in the context of a tradition is common knowledge among 
folk artists involved in egg decoration. Traditions and conventions give meaning to the 
creation. In the words of Rodica Berechea, “you can’t, no matter what you do, 
abandon tradition, because you would be making something else [not Easter eggs] 
and it would be worthless”. Novelty is recognised as part and parcel of the decoration 
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work, especially since every Easter egg is different (after all, eggs are not of the exact 
same size and shape) “and even if I want to make a certain model, I still have to 
change something, it’s like it is easier to change then to let everything be the same 
every time” (Livia Balacian). This drive towards creating the new is frequently noted by 
folk artists, however originality is never considered a break with tradition, but a 
continuation of it. Even when highly innovative families of decorators contributed to 
diversifying the working techniques and the existing types of Easter eggs (working eggs 
with coloured wax in relief, drawing on the egg with coloured wax, making Easter eggs 
for different seasons, something that led to the now common ‘Christmas eggs’, etc.), 
everything done was believed to enrich the tradition and keep it alive. In the end, 
there is always a subtle dynamic between ‘new’ and ‘old’ that governs the craft of 
egg decoration, beautifully captured in appreciations such as: “We keep the tradition. 
But in every egg, in the colours, there is a little piece of us” (Rodica Berechea).  
 
Assessing ‘objectively’ and in absolute terms how creative an Easter egg is with regard 
to its originality would be a difficult task. It would require comparisons with each and 
every Easter egg ever made and this is, of course, impossible. In fact, creativity tests’ 
scoring systems themselves reflect this difficulty. Most of the times creativity is measured 
using divergent thinking tests, which invite respondents to give as many answers as they 
can to an open-ended question and then score responses for fluency (total number of 
responses), originality (unusualness or uniqueness of responses), and flexibility (variety of 
responses) (see Runco, 2004). This way originality is evaluated based on comparisons 
between answers and answers themselves are never capable of exhausting all 
possibilities. The fact is that, when deciding what is new and original, we always rely on 
comparative judgements, on the knowledge we and others have about the world of 
existing artefacts that makes up a cultural domain. This is why authors like Montuori and 
Purser (1995, p. 71) advocate for the importance of studying the “‘genealogy’ of 
creativity and the contextual influences that lead us to consider works to be creative in 
our present period”. 
 
Looking into the ‘genealogy’ of creativity in the case of Easter egg making reveals an 
interesting aspect for our understanding of creativity. Novelty and originality are 
certainly central criteria for ‘diagnosing’ creative outcomes, but in everyday life the 
attribution of creativity is founded on much more than this and often involves 
comparative judgements between ‘classes of artefacts’. An Easter egg, or a type of 
Easter eggs, is more or less creative compared to another egg or type of decoration. 
This is how there tends to be a general agreement that ‘traditional’ eggs are the most 
creative and that eggs decorated with stickers are the least creative. Furthermore, 
when explaining creativity evaluations, people refer to a variety of aspects. Four 
associations are particularly salient. The first connects creativity and work, where higher 
creativity comes out of effort and skill, of “thinking through” and making “cognitive 
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effort”. The second one links creativity and beauty, creative eggs need to have an 
aesthetic appearance. Thirdly, creativity has to do with the ‘quality’ of the work, a very 
important criterion for folk artists themselves, who appreciate that working with “soul” 
and dedication is paramount. Finally, creativity is intrinsically related to meaning. Eggs 
with stickers are often labelled as uncreative and kitsch especially because they are 
“outside” of the Easter tradition; they are, as one ethnographer put it, “a synthesis 
made by people with no roots”. Of course, ideas of value and meaning are also 
important for the scientific definition of creativity, as we shall discuss next.        
 
Valuable and useful    
 
As mentioned from the beginning of the article, psychology operates with the dual 
criteria of novelty and usefulness in distinguishing the creative form the non-creative. If 
there is little ambiguity about what it means to be new and original, the second 
‘dimension’ of creative products is presented under a variety of names. Among these, 
authors refer to: being tenable or useful or satisfying (Stein, 1962), intelligible (Hausman, 
1979), appropriate or useful (Runco, 2007; Martindale, 1994), correct and valuable 
(Amabile, 1996), significant (Mason, 2003), fitting constrains (Lubart, 2003), compelling 
(Sternberg, 2006), etc. Moreover, it is slightly unclear what the reference term for this 
criterion is: the situation or task that generated the creative outcome or the group of 
people who use it, or both. This is quite an important aspect because it marks the 
difference between ‘objective’ assessment (thinking about the nature of the task) and 
‘subjective’ assessment of creativity (thinking about how the creative product impacts 
the existence of different persons and groups). Whatever the interpretation though, the 
‘value’ dimension is meant to draw the line between a creative result and a simply 
bizarre one (Arieti, 1976, p. 4).  
 
Three observations derive from this. To start with, including usefulness in the definition of 
creativity raises some problems when it comes to evaluating all ‘original’ expressions 
with no demonstrable social value. In this large category we can include dreams, 
unexpected thoughts or the imaginative gestures born out of children’s curiosity (Barron 
and Harrington, 1981, p. 441). It would certainly be appropriate in these cases to use a 
particular definition of ‘value’ that is less based on tangible contributions and more on 
adaptability and emotional impact. Second, by adopting utility as a central aspect of 
creativity we are confining this phenomenon to the ‘bright’ side of human experience. 
This is a curious situation for scientific enquiry, used to place phenomena on 
continuums and to avoid assigning any ‘moral’ dimension to them. Creativity, it seems, 
is always ‘good’, and this is certainly something well-reflected in popular Western 
culture as well, where being creative is one of the most highly priced virtues a person 
could have. Finally, it is to be noted that there is some ‘tension’ between the two 
defining features of creativity, a kind of tension that is at the core of any type of 
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creative expression: that between originality and appropriateness, between 
disrespecting rules and playing by the rules, between being ‘new’ and yet fitting into 
the ‘old’. As previously commented on, folk artists are very much aware of this reality 
that is shaping every aspect of their work.      
 
What are the constrains that, once respected, make an Easter egg ‘valuable’ and 
therefore contribute to its creativity? Unsurprisingly, there are different constrains for 
different people according to their professional background and engagement with 
decoration practices. Ethnographers and priests, for example, who are rarely involved 
in any complicated forms of decoration, emphasise traditional and religious constrains. 
For them, both red eggs (with clear symbolic value) and eggs decorated with wax are 
‘appropriate’ considering the nature and purpose of this custom as an integral part of 
the Easter celebration. In the words of one of the priests, Easter eggs are creative: 
 
“for as long as the meaning of being an Easter egg is not lost. For as long as they 
are not dissociated from symbolism, for as long as the ones seeing the Easter egg 
don’t forget the tight connection it has with the sacrifice of our Savior”.    
 
Art teachers, who are sometimes involved in adorning eggs at home and/or with their 
students before Easter, focus more on the aesthetic constrains of the task. Without 
losing track of the traditional meaning of a decorated egg, they are preoccupied as 
well with chromatic harmony, the choice of shapes and their disposition on the egg, 
with being able to apply colours on small surfaces and allowing them to dry before 
continuing to work, etc. Such practical constrains are also essential for folk artists. When 
they talk about what makes a ‘good’ Easter egg they start explaining the rules of 
decoration such as: not making mistakes when working with wax (since even if you 
remove the wax, the surface will not preserve colour properly), segmenting the egg 
before drawing the motifs, obeying the law of symmetry whenever possible, not 
juxtaposing similar colours and aiming for chromatic harmony, starting always from 
bright colours and ending with darker ones, using clean wax and applying it at the 
same level (for eggs with wax in relief), etc. In the end, the final measure of 
‘appropriateness’ for folk artists is given by how much the eggs are liked and bought. 
This operates as a selection criterion since, at the end of the day, it is the ‘market’ who 




Up until now we can conclude that the evaluation of creativity depends both on 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ criteria (see also Kasof, 1995). We can also state that, so-
called ‘objective’ measures (how different something is from what existed before, how 
well does it conform to the constraints of the task) are relative in themselves and often 
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end up relying on social agreement (can we know everything that existed before? who 
sets the constraints of a task?). New artefacts, once they emerge, “demand 
interpretation” (Zittoun et al., 2003, p. 429). And interpretations require communication 
with other people, interaction and engagement with existing cultural artefacts. In fact 
we can say that we never perceive creativity as such since it clearly lacks any physical 
reality, we interpret the outcome as creative, we infer that it came out of a creative 
process and even go as far as to attribute creativity to the ‘author’. In all cases 
creativity is based on subjective reception at the level of ‘audience’ members: 
“Perfection in execution cannot be measured or defined in terms of execution; it 
implies those who perceive and enjoy the product that is executed” (Dewey, 1934, p. 
49). And, as Dewey goes on to argue, the ‘creator’, both while creating and once the 
work is finished, also acts as an ‘audience’, trying to interpret the work from the 
perspective of others.  
 
This state of affairs probably brings a saying to mind, ‘beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder’. And if indeed creativity is so relative as to depend on the subjectivity of 
each and every individual than surely science could not be able to say anything about 
the topic and would exclude it from its preoccupations. At the same time it would be 
impossible to try and claim the absolute ‘objectivity’ of creativity. What is there to do? 
The answer that ‘solves’ all these epistemological dilemmas is that one can try to study 
creativity based on subjective reception or judgement because subjective evaluations 
(especially in the case of experts) are extremely consensual. This is the basis for the 
consensual definition and assessment technique pioneered in the psychology of 
creativity by Teresa Amabile. Her approach to creativity is that “a product or response 
is creative to the extent that appropriate observers independently agree it is creative” 
(Amabile, 1996, p. 33). Consequently, creativity is to be studied with the help of 
‘appropriate’ observers, ideally familiar with the domain of the ‘creation’, observers 
who independently agree on whether something is or not creative and on the level of 
creativity. Of course the use of expert judges has deep roots in creativity studies, but 
what makes Amabile’s contribution unique is the fact that she argued (and 
demonstrated in her research) that judges don’t even need to start from an explicit 
definition of creativity. Subjective reception will do, and it will generally prove 
consensual between people. The consensual assessment technique is widely used 
today in the literature and the consensual definition of creativity is accepted by most 
researchers (Lubart, 2003). It is indeed comforting for creativity scholars to think that, 
although “no person, act or product is creative or noncreative in itself” (Gardner, 1004, 
p. 145), creativity ‘exists’ at the level of subjective reception. In addition, we are on 
‘firm ground’ whenever experts evaluate creativity, as compared to lay people. 
 
What would an exercise of using both expert and non-expert opinions say about 
creativity? What would it mean to include the opinions of creators themselves? The 
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study of Easter egg creativity with the use of multiple groups of evaluators, all 
belonging to different ‘communities of interest’ for this artistic craft, shows how 
consensus in evaluations is always complemented by divergence. For example there is 
great consensus among ethnographers, priests, art teachers and folk artists alike that 
‘traditional’ forms of egg decoration require creativity of a higher level. At the same 
time, not all forms of wax decoration are considered equally valuable (to use the 
established terminology). Drawing on the egg with coloured wax is catalogue by some 
ethnographers as stepping outside of established canons. Moreover, eggs decorated 
with Christmas motives are considered an expression of kitsch by several 
ethnographers, priests and art teachers. Notably, folk artists are more open to 
‘innovations’ and show respect (at least at a declarative level) towards all types of 
decoration. Red eggs, although largely considered as involving less creative ability, are 
nonetheless highly ‘valuable’ for what they represent, especially for priests and 
ethnographers. Opinions diverge again in what eggs decorated with leaves are 
concerned. An illustration of ‘creativity in the small’ for ethnographers and priests, they 
are potentially very creative for art teachers depending on what types of leaves are 
used and how they are used, and whether they are painted further with watercolours. 
In conclusion, evaluators from the four groups show that there are at least two different 
types of ‘reception’ of Easter eggs, one supporting the idea of clear differences in 
creativity (found predominantly among ethnographers and priests), and the other 
advocating for the creative potential of each decorated egg (more common among 
art teachers and folk artists). These different evaluations are rendered meaningful when 
we look at what types of personal engagement with the practice and relations with 
others and a shared socio-cultural background are characteristic for each of the four 
different groups. Subjective reception of the new, as we will argue next, is rooted in the 
larger frames of ‘cultural reception’ specific for every community and every society.                   
    
Cultural Reception 
 
“Originality, freshness of perceptions, divergent-thinking ability are all well and 
good in their own right, as desirable personal traits. But without some form of 
public recognition they do not constitute creativity. In fact, one might argue that 
such traits are not even necessary for creative accomplishment. (…) Therefore it 
follows that what we call creativity is a phenomenon that is constructed through 
an interaction between producer and audience. Creativity is not the product of 
single individuals, but of social systems making judgements about individuals’ 
products” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999, p. 314). 
 
Positions such as that of Csikszentmihalyi might be considered extreme by mainstream 
creativity researchers who would find unsettling the idea that all our criteria for 
‘recognising’ creativity should be replaced by one and one only: social judgement. 
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While it might indeed be arguable whether novelty, originality, utility are “not even 
necessary” for creativity to be attributed, it is certainly important to realise that all 
creativity evaluations are framed by socio-cultural systems of beliefs, norms and 
practices. The ultimate validation of creativity depends on social agreement which, in 
its turn, is shaped by broader cultural structures. As Negus and Pickering (2004, p. 23) 
state, our actions and the products we create are never fully realised as creative acts 
until they are achieved within some form of social encounter. Our ‘subjective 
reception’ of creativity is conditioned to a large extent by ‘cultural reception’, the set 
of principles and rules used in a particular culture (of a group, a community or of an 
entire society) to legitimise creativity. Since we all are subjected to processes of 
enculturation, we end up internalising these ‘cultural lenses’ which provide us with 
useful mental short-cuts or heuristics for deciding what is and what is not creative. 
 
For example there is a great tendency in many cultures to automatically consider 
everything labelled as ‘art’ to be ‘creative’. The reverse is also true, and Runco (2007, 
p. 384) referred to this as the ‘art bias’, reducing creativity to artistic talent alone. This 
ends up making the terms ‘creative’ and ‘artistic’ interchangeable, something that 
also came out of the study of Easter egg creativity. Asked whether or not Easter eggs, 
as a class of cultural artefacts, can be considered creative, many respondents from all 
the four groups answered by giving arguments about their indisputable artistic value. 
The assumption is clear: Easter eggs are, in most cases, forms of art and art involves 
creativity. Categories such as ‘decorative art’ or ‘folk art’ are frequently used in 
discussing the creativity of decorated eggs. Moreover, art teachers are ready to claim 
high artistic value for some Easter eggs as forms of “pure art”. This naturally opposes 
them to more trivial everyday life expressions, thus reproducing an implicit distinction 
between ‘high’ art and ‘popular’ or folk art, where the latter is always seen as less 
creative and valuable than the former (see Dewey, 1934).  
 
Culture doesn’t only offer us the lenses through which to look at the world, and 
therefore also at creativity, but, through social interaction and processes of education, 
we also acquire the ability to ‘decode’, to understand the objects and situations that 
we encounter. In this regard Bourdieu (1993, p. 22) talked about ‘artistic competences’ 
as forms of knowledge that allow us “to situate the work of art in relation to the universe 
of artistic possibilities of which it is part”. Generalising this we might say that some 
people also come to acquire and be recognised for their ‘creativity competencies’ or 
ability to identify and evaluate creativity. We refer to these people as ‘experts’ but it is 
important to keep in mind that their definition would be ‘persons who demonstrate 
superior ability in mastering the cultural codes that define creativity’. In a way they are 
the ones who ‘embody’ the ‘cultural reception’ of creativity since their judgements are 
not only expressive of existing cultural norms but also constitute them. Cultural 
reception is therefore based on culturally-constructed codes for distinguishing 
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creativity. It consequently sets the boundaries of the creative ‘domain’ and makes the 
question ‘Is this creative?’ meaningful in certain situations and not others. To return to 
the example of Easter eggs, the question concerning their creativity was ‘controversial’ 
for at least some of the priests. For this group in particular, Easter eggs belong to a 
different universe of significations, built around the notions of faith, religious practices 
and the Resurrection, and evaluating these eggs based on their creativity was not the 
most ‘appropriate’ or ‘natural’ thing to do. 
 
One conclusion emerging from our discussion above is that creativity evaluations are 
potentially consensual within the same professional group, community or culture, but 
also potentially divergent between groups, communities and cultures. The cross-cultural 
study of creativity testifies to this last claim. Creativity in the West is very much product-
centred, focusing on originality and the pragmatic aspects of problem-solving, while 
Easter cultures are more process-centred when it comes to creativity, emphasising 
personal fulfilment, enlightenment and inner growth (Lubart, 1999; Raina, 1999; 
Westwood and Low, 2003). The scientific literature on creativity could not have 
remained oblivious to these findings. The fact that lay conceptions are crucial for 
‘discovering’ the creativity of certain products or people inspired a growing body of 
literature on implicit theories of creativity. Although tempting as a theoretical 
perspective, the assumptions Runco (1999b, p. 27) starts from in defining implicit 
theories as belonging only to non-scientists (scientists always ‘explicitate’ their theories) 
and being often “personal rather than shared” are surprising. As the present article 
strived to argue, personal constructs of creativity are always embedded in social 
constructs (see also Weiner, 2000), just as subjective reception is framed by cultural 
reception. This does not mean that two persons from the same culture think the same 
about creativity and evaluate it in an identical ways (in the end culture is a plural 
phenomenon and we cannot leave out personal life experiences) but that cultural 
values are powerful ‘guidelines’ we tend to follow in conscious or subconscious ways. 
The implicit theories of creativity ethnographers, priests, art teachers and folk artists 
hold, for example, show both communalities and particularities and these can be 
explained by the fact that, while all respondents belong to the same national culture, 
they are also members of different professional groups. For folk artists and 
ethnographers creativity is a continuation of tradition, for priests a form of improving 
what already exists, for art teachers a natural ability alimented by our desire for the 
aesthetic. Thinking about creativity necessarily leads us to thinking about culture.                          
 
When can we say something is creative? 
 
In the end, we have to return to our initial question and see what we might have 
learned about identifying creativity in everyday life. As a starting point we would need 
to agree with Lubart’s (2003, p. 11) assertion that: “There are no absolute norms to 
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judge the creativity of a product”. And yet, both science and common sense make 
constant efforts to anchor the notion of creativity in products that are collectively 
recognised as creative. At the core of a potential definition of creativity seem to stand 
the features of newness and originality. Creativity means generating ‘difference’, but 
not of any kind. When it comes to creative products, there is merit in being different 
(Hausman, 1979, p. 240), and ideas of value and usefulness come to complement 
those about novelty and originality. Within these grounds, specific for the psychology of 
creativity, there is an important argument to be settled: is creativity evaluation an 
‘objective’ process? In other words, do we need subjective judgement to decide what 
is new, original, useful? This question is not gratuitous. In the efforts made to promote 
‘objective’ measures of creativity lies the assumption that creativity in itself has an 
‘objective’ nature, an assumption rightfully catalogued by Csikszentmihalyi (1999, p. 
321) as “too metaphysical to be considered part of a scientific approach”. The 
arguments and examples given so far in this article indicate that, outside of ‘newness’, 
appreciating originality and especially usefulness require some degree of subjective 
judgement and, in any case, these qualities are always relative (to what we know, to 
the reference points we take, etc.). This is how, in the past few decades, the emphasis 
on ‘subjective reception’ increased and today the use of the consensual assessment 
technique is widespread. Paradoxically though, the grounds on which this 
methodology is employed can in fact take us back to the idea of an ‘objective’ 
existence of creativity. If personal evaluations of creativity ‘naturally’ converge then 
there must be something about creativity in itself that can be immediately recognised 
(at least by experts). But the real question is: is it something about creativity, or does it 
have more to do with the cultural lenses we ‘wear’ and ‘use’? The first conclusion to be 
taken out of this article is that subjective reception is in fact conditioned, to a large 
extent, by cultural systems of beliefs and norms about creativity. And these beliefs and 
norms are both similar and different across cultures. In the end it might even be that 
ideas about originality and usefulness act as common cross-cultural ‘anchors’ for 
creativity (although evidence suggests they are more reflective of Western values).  
 
The analysis of creativity in the context of Easter egg decoration in Romania points 
exactly to the intricacies of both creative expression and evaluation. It shows that 
opinions tend to converge when it comes to the creativity of ‘traditionally’ decorated 
eggs and also to the ‘un-creative’ nature of Easter eggs decorated with stickers. The 
two ends of the creativity continuum, as it were, pose little problems. What about the 
‘middle’ instances? The creativity of eggs decorated with leaves for example is harder 
to appreciate by participants because, while it fades when compared to wax 
decoration, it does certainly involve more than the simple dying of eggs. It is also 
interesting to notice that, although persons from different professional groups agree on 
the fact that creativity is involved in ‘traditional’ decoration, the ways in which they 
reach this conclusion are slightly different. Ethnographers and priests emphasise the 
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value of these products for continuing a deep and meaningful Romanian tradition. Art 
teachers and folk artists are more inclined to appreciate the beauty and artistic 
harmony characteristic for these products. Such discrepancies are important since, as it 
came out of the research, members from all these groups engage in Easter egg 
decoration and relate to others who decorate differently, based on their conceptions 
of creativity, art and tradition. Ethnographers decide on what types of Easter eggs are 
to be displayed at Museum fairs, priests tell their parishioners what types of eggs are to 
be appreciated, art teachers teach students in the classroom how to make an Easter 
egg and folk artists continue producing the kinds of eggs that correspond to what they 
like and what customers want. Understanding creativity evaluations in this folk art 
context therefore needs to take into account the ‘ecology’ of practices, social 
relations and beliefs presupposed by the craft. This is the case, we can assume, for all 
















Figure 1. The multi-layered approach to creativity assessment 
 
In light of the above, one contribution to the literature on creativity assessment would 
be to define it as a multi-layered process. Figure 1 tries to depict the multi-layered 
nature of our criteria for identifying and assessing creativity. This depiction suggests that 
while newness and originality are central for evaluating the creativity of products, they 
always need to be ‘qualified’ by reference to value and utility. Furthermore, all these 
aspects are often perceived and appreciated in ‘subjective’ ways and personal 
judgements about creativity are formulated in the broader context of cultural norms for 
the reception and recognition of creativity. This embedment in culture needs to be 
taken more seriously into account by current research on creativity and especially by 
modern assessment techniques. In addition, the multi-layered approach would require 





































assessment (novelty, usefulness, subjective judgement, etc.); b) how these criteria 
relate to other micro- or macro-level factors (from comparisons within a pre-set sample 
of responses to dialogue with larger cultural frames) and c) who makes the assessment 
(the author, ‘lay’ persons, experts, etc.), based on what theoretical assumptions 
(creativity as ‘subjective’, as ‘objective’, etc.) and with what practical implications. Of 
course not everyone would happily accept this approach. Runco (1999a, pp. 242-243) 
for example advocated for separating creativity from reputation, novelty and 
aesthetic appeal from social value and impact. This, in the author’s vision, would make 
for “good science” and also “increase the objectivity of creativity research”. But is 
‘good science’ troubled by or unable to deal with the complexities of our existence as 
social beings? Is it upset by the idea of relativity and by the study of culture? Because, if 
this is the case, then probably creativity cannot be approached with its means. We 
could maybe study ‘creation’, understood as the mere generation of a new artefact, 
something different than what (we know) existed before, but not creativity. The 
richness, complexity, and, in the end, the importance of creativity for our daily lives rests 
exactly in the fact that it is a psycho-socio-cultural phenomenon (Glăveanu, 2010c). 
When we lose the social and cultural from sight we ‘mutilate’ the phenomenon we are 
aiming to study and we end up studying something else.  
 
What other research implications can we take from these conclusions? To begin with, 
we need to think about modalities of contextualising creativity evaluations and of 
being more sensitive to the social and cultural dynamics behind their generation. We 
can always start our study of the cultural context by looking at what particular cultures 
(at a community or national level) celebrate as being creative and see how these 
‘examples’ infiltrate commonsensical notions of creativity and become an important 
point of reference for both acknowledged and anonymous creators. Besides, such 
criteria also ‘contaminate’ the way in which we build and score creativity tests and, in 
this area at least, serious efforts are made at present to generate culture-specific norms 
for creativity assessment (despite resulting difficulties in comparing test results; see 
Lubart, 1999; Westwood and Low, 2003). Paying more attention to lay conceptions of 
creativity and incorporating their insights into our theories about the phenomenon and 
our assessment tools can only increase their ecological validity and can “help make 
our definitions more realistic and practical” (Runco and Bahleda, 1986, p. 94). Another 
significant question from a methodological perspective is: Who should judge creativity? 
Is it the author, the community, scientists? If we do adopt a perspective in which 
creativity it to a large extent culturally constructed than we come to realise that it is not 
important ‘who’ evaluates creativity but ‘where’ these evaluations come from and 
how they affect the creators and their larger communities. Anyone can evaluate 
creativity and every one of us, in different circumstances (at home, at work, at school, 
in museums or at science fairs, etc.), more explicitly or implicitly, does so. This doesn’t 
mean that expert judges are to be dismissed; there is certainly value in the opinion of 
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trained professionals. But again, maybe more ‘ecological’ value and more direct 
impact on the ‘creation’ and the ‘creator’ have those judgements made by people 
who are in a position to influence either one of them (who could be defined as 
belonging to ‘communities of interest’). If we are to understand creativity we need to 
consider who the ‘actors’ of creative acts are and these actors are certainly more 
numerous than the creator him/herself (Glăveanu, 2010a). Finally, and related to the 
above, it would be also worthwhile exploring all ‘mismatches’ in the evaluation of 
certain artefacts, what happens when creativity is attributed to an object that was not 
intended by its author to actually be ‘creative’, or when the status of ‘creative’ is given 
after some time to certain creations (the classical case of Van Gogh) or, more 
interestingly, taken away from them. These situations are most revealing of the ‘cultural 
frames’ discussed in this article and point to their dynamic and co-constructed nature.  
 
In concluding, we can offer a tentative answer to the question: ‘How can we say 
something is creative?’ in the form of ‘Something is creative when it is, to our 
knowledge, new and culturally validated as creative, which, in the West at least, often 
means being appreciated as original and useful’. Therefore nothing is creative 
because it just is creative. There is always a factor of subjective reception and social 
agreement involved. To say that creativity exists as such, independent of any context, 
just means being tricked by linguistic reification or following strictly positivistic criteria 
that struggle to eliminate subjectivity, relativity, or common sense forms of knowledge. 
The psychological science of creativity should not fall in either of these traps. Operating 
with emic, locally informed criteria, rather than ethic, universal standards in the case of 
creativity (Glăveanu, 2010b) leads by no means to the dissolution of creativity as a 
notion, but to an integrative vision that does justice to the complexity of the 
phenomenon under study. Recognising the fact that we don’t ‘discover’ but ‘create’ 
creativity takes nothing away from the importance of the concept and the necessity of 
understanding its underlying processes. If anything, it opens a new challenging path for 
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